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The Canons of Statutory

Construction and Judicial
Constraints: A Response to Macey
and Miller
Lawrence C. Marshall*
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller claim to have set
out to provide a positivist explanation for why judges ever invoke canons in the course of interpreting statutes.' In truth, though, their
question is a far broader one. What they really seek to explain is why
judges ever use any interpretive tools in the course of interpreting statutes. Why, Macey and Miller want to know, don't judges simply decide
what result in the case will best promote a good outcome on the
grounds of public policy, intrinsic fairness, economic efficiency or
wealth maximization? 2 This question is perplexing to Macey and Miller
because they are convinced (as a normative matter) that such public
policy factors (what they refer to as exogenous considerations) necessarily should trump any interpretive methodology (interior justifications)
such as looking at the plain language of the statute or invoking recognized canons to help discern legislative intent or purpose. Macey and
Miller are not at all shy about this premise:
Policy justifications clearly trump other justifications in any meaningful hierarchy
of judicial values.
It makes sense to invoke non-policy justifications for deciding cases only when
judges are unable to determine the policy implications of a particular decision. The
following example illustrates this point. Suppose a judge could decide a case one
way by invoking a canon of statutory construction, or another way by invoking
some public policy rationale. Suppose further that societal wealth and human flourishing would increase dramatically if the decision were made on the basis of public
policy, but would diminish dramatically if the case were decided on the basis of
the
3
canons. Quite clearly, the public policy justification should trump the canon.
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and JudicialPreferences, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 647 (1992).
2. Id. at part II.
3. Id. at part III. At a few points Macey and Miller define public policy as "broad enough to
embrace concepts like the separation of powers, and the idea that legislatures, not courts, should
take the lead role in making law." Id. at part II. But they treat these concepts as exogenous considerations which might affect a particular judge's attitude toward making public policy, not as con-
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Working from this foundation, Macey and Miller go on to theorize that
the instances in which judges do not rest their decisions on public policy are instances in which judges do not hold secure views about what

result is the most consistent with good public policy.
There are two major flaws in Macey and Miller's analysis. First, it
assumes that all judges share the normative view that in interpreting

statutes the judge's natural desire to implement the best public policy
should trump the effort to discern congressional intent or purpose
through canons and other devices. Second, it supposes that the public,
the Congress, and the legal community would tolerate courts whose
statutory interpretation decisions make no effort to tie their results
back to the statute at issue. If either of these suppositions are wrong,
and I believe that they both are, then Macey and Miller's thesis neces-

sarily fails. Instead, it is evident that judges announce their decisions
by reference to interpretive principles-including canons-either because the judges actually believe that their role requires them to reach
their decisions on such grounds whenever possible, or, at the very least,
because the pressure created by the dominant legal culture and institu-

tions therein requires judges to announce their decisions on interpretive
grounds whenever possible.
I.

JUDGE STEWARD

As A

STATUTORY INTERPRETER

It is perilous to generalize, as Macey and Miller have, about how
and what judges, as a class, think. It is a bit less perilous to consider
how some judges are apt to think about certain fundamental issues.
Thus, without expressing any normative view on whether I am sympathetic to the judicial character I am about to describe, I submit that
such judges do exist, and that their existence rebuts much of Macey
and Miller's analysis.
The judge I have in mind (I will call him Judge Steward) has always been inspired by the view of separation of powers that he first
acquired in his eighth-grade civics class and that has been reinforced in
him through the writings of courts and various legal scholars. He approaches the question of statutory interpretation with some very strong
views about legislative supremacy. In Judge Steward's view, the virtue
of the American system of government is the power that it gives the
people (acting through their elected representatives) to do anything-including enacting bad public policy-subject only to constitutional limitations. In sum, Judge Steward believes in what Cass
Sunstein has called the "most prominent conception of the role of
courts . . . in statutory construction": that courts "are agents or sercepts that require the judge to decide cases on interpretive grounds whenever possible.
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vants of the legislature.""
Judge Steward is hardly so naive as to think that he can always
separate his assessment of what a statute means or what Congress intended from his political judgment and general intuition.5 He recognizes the inevitability-especially in hard cases-that his general views
on life will subconsciously affect his perspective. Indeed, in some cases
the question of what Congress really wanted to accomplish is so elusive
to Judge Steward that he is openly willing to base his decision on more
policy-oriented grounds. But these realizations do not call into doubt
Judge Steward's view of his preferred role as a faithful agent of
Congress.
Thus, even if Judge Steward believes (and believes very strongly)
that it is very bad public policy to subvert an eighty million dollar dam
project to save the snail darter population, he nonetheless willingly will
render a decision subverting that project if he believes that the statute
Congress has passed requires that result.6 For Judge Steward believes
that it is up to Congress-and not up to the unelected judiciary-to
decide "the order of priorities in a given area, '' 7 no matter how foolish
this may seem to the judge who is enforcing Congress's prioritization8
Similarly, even if Judge Steward believes (and believes very strongly)
that it is quite senseless and inhumane to refuse to consider the hardship that deportation will inflict on nieces whom an illegal alien is raising, the judge will refuse to consider this factor if Congress has clearly
provided that only hardship on an alien's children (as defined statutorily) is to be considered.' For Judge Steward believes (and believes very
strongly) that "policy questions" such as these are "entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and [that courts]
have no judicial authority to substitute [their] political judgment for
that of the Congress. '' 1

Interestingly, Judge Steward's intellectual commitment to legislative supremacy also may be fueled by some of the factors that Macey
and Miller have described as cutting against judicial policymaking in
4. Cass R. Sunstein, After The Rights Revolution 112 (Harvard, 1990). Sunstein, of course,
rejects this approach as fatally flawed in its application.
5. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533 (1992).
6. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
7. Id. at 194.
8. Occasionally, Judge Steward might consider a particular result which otherwise seems to
follow from accepted methods of interpretation to be so absurd that he will reject that result as
one not accurately reflecting Congress's intent. Even as he rejects such a result, though, his goal
remains to apply the rule that he believes Congress to have intended, not to enforce his own views
of public policy.
9. See INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986).
10. Id. at 89, quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977).
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some cases. For example, Judge Steward may think that as generalists
federal judges lack the kind of expertise that congressional committees
and administrative agencies possess in their specific subject matters.
Moreover, Judge Steward may believe that the specter of "general
moral and intellectual uncertainty"'1 provides a strong justification for
judges to follow the edicts of a popularly elected Congress. But unlike
the judges that Macey and Miller describe, Judge Steward believes that
these factors support a general rule of deference to congressional
will"-not only a rule of deference to be invoked selectively in cases
where judicial expertise is particularly low and feelings of moral and
intellectual relativity particularly high.
It is Judge Steward's views about legislative supremacy and the relatively passive role the judiciary should play in interpreting statutes
that prompt him to use canons among the other devices he employs in
ascertaining statutory meaning or intent. This is not to say that invoking canons of statutory interpretation is always consistent with Judge
Steward's view of his proper role in discerning meaning and intent.
Many of the canons that have been developed-especially some of relatively recent vintage-seem, in Judge Steward's view, to be intent-frustrating devices through which judges impute many of their own
substantive or ideological views to Congress.' 3 But many canons do constitute rules of interpretation that, with varying levels of accuracy, evaluate a statute's words and structure in an attempt to discern statutory
meaning or legislative intent.'4 It is these canons that Judge Steward
feels comfortable using in his role as an interpreter of statutes.
Judge Steward also recognizes that the canons, standing alone, do
not always provide him enough guidance to decide most cases. He rec11.
12.

Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part II.C (cited in note 1).
I recognize that there is a school of textualists, led by Justice Scalia, which rejects the

notion that courts are bound to follow the intent or purpose of the legislature. Instead, these textualists argue, courts are bound to apply the words of the statute. See generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990). For my purposes here, however, these
textualists can be grouped with those who focus on legislative intent inasmuch as both schools

reject the kind of policy-driven decisionmaking that Macey and Miller describe.
13. For a description of some of these canons (by authors who don't necessarily share Judge
Steward's criticism of them) see William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
For a more critical appraisal of these rules, see Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1992).
14. Indeed, Professor Miller's own writing forcefully supports the view that "many traditional maxims of statutory interpretation," including the ejusdem generis maxim, "embody legitimate and valid inferences of legislative intent." See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation,1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179, 1224. See also id. at 1199-1202 (discussing the
ejusdem generis principle). It is odd, therefore, that he now suggests that any judge truly interested in discerning legislative intent will focus on legislative history, and not canons of interpretation. See Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part II (cited in note 1).
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ognizes the power of Karl Llewellyn's classic thrusts and parries showing that for every canon there is another to contradict it. 15 But Judge
Steward understands that he usually has a strong intuitive sense about
which of the competing canons best fits the case before him. As Geoffrey Miller has written: "the fact that the maxims may work against
each other . . . does not establish the hopeless confusion posited by
Llewellyn's model. It is simply a matter of competing inferences drawn
16
from the evidence.
Could Judge Steward have signed on to the Supreme Court's deci7
sion in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers InternationalAssociation,1
the case which Macey and Miller use to support their thesis about why
and when judges invoke canons? He surely could have. The portion of
the opinion dealing with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) is certainly consistent with Judge Steward's approach, as it engages in a purely interpretive endeavor-using a variety
of tools, such as the ejusdem generis canon and legislative history, to
discern legislative intent. No attempt is made in that part of the opinion to discern whether the result necessarily comports with the Court's
view of good public policy.
There is, then, nothing about the canon-oriented analysis in the
LMRDA portion of Breininger that is inconsistent with Judge Steward's views. What about the major portion of the Breininger opinion
dealing with Breininger's claim that the union breached its duty of fair
representation to him? How could Judge Steward, who buys into the
formalist methodology just described, be willing to sign on to an opinion that makes no effort to tie itself to the words of a statute, or to
legislative intent and purpose? In the context of the Breininger case the
answer to this question is not very difficult to ascertain. Unlike the very
specific statutory claim that Breininger raised under the LMRDA, Breininger's duty of fair representation claim arose out of federal common
law. Ever since the Lincoln Mills decision,"8 which rightly or wrongly
interpreted section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act as giving federal courts
the power to create a federal common law of labor relations, the federal
courts have engaged in a basically noninterpretive, policy-driven enterprise of common law adjudication in this area.' 9 It is not at all surpris15. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950).
16. Miller, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. at 1202 (cited in note 14).
17. 493 U.S. 67 (1989). Breiningeris described at some length in Macey and Miller, 45 Vand.
L. Rev. at parts II, III.D (cited in note 1).
18. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. See James E. Jones, Jr., Time for a Midcourse Correction?, in Jean T. McKelvey, ed.,
The Changing Law of Fair Representation 223, 225 (Cornell, 1985) (stating that a duty of fair
representation is a "judicial invention mothered by constitutional necessity").
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ing, therefore, that the Court in Breininger openly addressed policy
considerations in reaching a decision about the proper forum for bringing a duty of fair representation claim. It is this critical difference between interpreting a specific statute and developing common law under
a broad delegation statute that explains the very different way that the
Court addressed the two distinct issues involved in Breininger.
In sum, Judge Steward is willing to look at exogenous policy considerations, but only when intent-seeking tools-including intent-oriented canons-are incapable of providing an answer.2 ° In this sense, his
hierarchy of decisional principles is completely opposite that posited by
Macey and Miller. Judge Steward does not rely on interpretive canons
only when he is insufficiently confident in his assessment of policy; he
relies upon policy only when he is insufficiently confident in his ability
to discern intent from conventional canons and other interpretive
devices.
II.

JUDGE MACEY AS A STATUTORY INTERPRETER

It is useless to venture guesses on how prevalent Judge Steward's
views are among those who currently occupy the federal bench. I certainly would not want to challenge Macey and Miller's thesis simply by
positing that all judges who invoke canons (as they all do) share Judge
Steward's views. Instead, let me concede that there are many judges
who, consciously or subconsciously, often reach their decisions based in
whole or in large part on what Macey and Miller call exogenous policy
considerations. 21 It is appropriate, therefore, to ask why and when these
judges opt to invoke canons as they write some of their opinions in
cases of statutory interpretation.
This question is a very different one than the question that Macey
20. It is certainly fair to ask why Judge Steward, with his strong views about representative
democracy and discomfort with lawmaking by the judiciary, is willing to engage in this commonlaw (quasi-legislative) enterprise. Perhaps the judge has a strong view of stare decisis which drives
him to comply with Lincoln Mills and its progeny, including the cases developing the duty of fair

representation. Or perhaps the judge sees a real difference between his narrow role in deciding
cases about which Congress has specifically spoken and his broader role in deciding cases about
which Congress has delegated its legislative authority to the courts. To paraphrase Justice Jackson's famous discussion of separation of powers: "When the [Court] acts pursuant to an express or

implied authorization of Congress, [its] authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that [it]
possesses in [its] own right plus all that Congress can delegate." On the other hand, "[wihen the
[Court] takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, [its] power is
at its lowest ebb, for then [it] can rely only upon [its] own constitutional powers, minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson concurring).
21. I agree with Macey and Miller that when a judge is willing to follow the canons only so
long as they result in decisions that comport with the judge's policy preferences, then the judge
really is following his policy preferences, not the canons.
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and Miller pose. For my question focuses on why a judge who bases her
decision on policy grounds then would proceed to explain the decision
on the basis of canons. Macey and Miller, on the other hand, seem to
reject the possibility that judges frequently write opinions that offer interpretive justifications for decisions that actually were reached on policy considerations. They claim that
[w]hile this is a possibility, for several reasons, it is improbable that this inclination
to obfuscation will dominate. First, judges with strong views on a particular matter
are likely to believe that those views are logical and coherent and that they can be
substantiated in the form of a well-reasoned written opinion. Judges with life tenure have no reason to refrain from articulating their views. Moreover, judges with
strong views about how a law should be construed or implemented inevitably will
want to persuade others that those views are correct. This can be done only by
articulating those views and explaining how they lead to a certain result in a particular case. Thus, it seems inevitable that a judge with a strong view on a legal issue
will express that view when given the opportunity."

This strong descriptive claim is a critical link in Macey and Miller's
argument. For if they are wrong-if it is reasonable to assume that
judges frequently will consciously or subconsciously hide their true bases of decisions behind the relatively neutral shield of the canons-then
looking at judicial opinions provides very little guidance on when judges
actually base their decisions on the canons of construction.
There is no shortage of insightful literature on the subject of judicial candor. For the most part, this literature tends to urge judges to be
more honest in articulating the true bases of their decisions to the extent that judges are able to identify accurately their own thought
processes. 3 On the other hand, some authors have sought to defend the
lack of candor in judicial decisions, arguing that its absence helps to
promote a variety of important values,24 and avoids the need for
debilitating introspection. 5 No matter how these writers come down on
the normative question though, they all seem to agree that judges often
have some very strong incentives to hide the fact that they are reaching
their decision on policy-oriented grounds, and that judges routinely issue decisions that do not disclose the actual decisional factors.
It is true, of course, that federal judges do not have to hide their
22. Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at n.45 (cited in note 1).
23. Some of the more recent literature on this age-old subject includes David L. Shapiro, In
Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731 (1987); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for
the Age of Statutes 172-81 (Harvard, 1982); Williams N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReason, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 353-362 (1990); Robert A. Leflar,
Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 721 (1979). Karl Llewellyn's work, of course, remains
a classic. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Little, Brown, 1960).
24. See generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation,78 Georgetown L. J. 353 (1989); Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42 Ohio St.
L. J. 411, 424-25 (1981).
25. See generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 296 (1990).
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true bases of decisions in order to keep their jobs. It hardly follows,
though, that the judge who is willing to reach her decision on noninterpretive, policy-oriented grounds will always be willing to advertise this
approach and to ignore conventional tools of statutory interpretation.
For whether or not one believes that the Judge Steward character that I
have described is a prevalent figure on the federal bench, it remains
true that our current political/legal culture is deeply committed to some
form of an agency view of statutory interpretation.2" As Cass Sunstein,
hardly an adherent of the potted plant view of judges' roles in the interpretation of statutes, explains:
The agency view, and formalism itself, contain some important truths. It would be
improper for courts to interpret statutes to mean whatever the judges think would
be best. No one could defend an approach to statutory construction that would
license judges to say that a statute means whatever they think a good statute would
say. This basic understanding derives from the lawmaking primacy of the legislature-a product of the legislature's superior democratic pedigree and its correlative
27
power to do as it chooses, at least where there is no constitutional doubt.

Given this widely held view of the impropriety of judges focusing on
purely exogenous considerations, it is fair to assume that a judge who
uses the job security of life tenure to openly ignore the words and intent of Congress is likely to experience a variety of negative
consequences.
Assume, for example, that Professor Macey were the district court
judge who was asked to rule on Brian Weber's claim that the United
Steelworkers Union and Kaiser Aluminum violated Title VII when they
entered into an agreement containing a race-conscious affirmative action program.28 Assume hypothetically that Judge Macey has strong
personal views that affirmative action plans are very poor social policy,
and that he generally welcomes the opportunity to make articulate arguments on why he believes this. Assume further that his beliefs on this
subject are so strong and secure that he is willing to reach his decision
on these grounds.29 It certainly does not follow from these assumptions
that Judge Macey would think it wise or prudent to couch his decision
in Weber in policy-oriented terms instead of trying to explain the decision as one compelled by the intent of Congress, as evidenced by either
statutory language, legislative history, or canons of construction. Among
the downsides of explaining his decision on broad policy terms are: the
increased likelihood that reviewing judges will reverse the decision if
26. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 133 (cited in note 4).
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
29.- Recall that in Macey's view "[p]olicy justifications clearly trump other justifications in
any meaningful hierarchy of judicial values." Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part III (cited
in note 1).
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they do not agree that explicit policy-oriented statutory interpretation
is appropriate in this case; the increased likelihood that reviewing
judges will reverse the decision if they do not agree with Judge Macey's
particular policy preferences; the potential for criticism from members
of the bench, academy, and general public who disagree with Judge Macey's willingness to base his decision on policy grounds; the chance that
the impact of Judge Macey's opinions in general will be decreased, as
he risks being branded an ideologue who does not follow the generally
accepted rules of the game (i.e., judges should interpret statutes); and
the potential negative effects that the decision may have on Judge Macey's career, in terms of potential promotions within the judiciary or to
other positions both because of his method of analysis as well as the
substantive views that he has articulated.
I make no attempt to be exhaustive in this listing, or to speculate
on which, if any, of these factors might seem relevant to Judge Macey
or any other judge.30 The point is that these considerations surely
demonstrate the weakness of Macey and Miller's claim that judges have
no reason to hide behind canons when they have strong views on what
the best result would be based on policy grounds."'
The list of factors that inhibit candor about decisions would be enhanced somewhat if Judge Macey were to become a circuit court judge.
As a judge of an intermediate court, he would still have concerns about
possible review of the case by a higher court, but also would have to be
concerned with the impact his explicitly policy-oriented decision would
have on his ability to "get a court" to join his decision in this and fu32
ture cases.
The list of factors changes once again when Justice Macey is deciding the case as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. In this role, there is no longer any immediate concern with how
some other set of judges will react to his opinion on direct review.
There is, however, room for concern about how future Courts will treat
the precedent, and about whether Congress is likely to react if the Su30. For a bit more elaborate discussion of this issue, see Lawrence L. Marshall, Intellectual
Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 832, 842-44 (1990).
31. Justice Roger Traynor summed it up well when he wrote that a judge's policy-oriented
decisions must not only "persuade his colleagues, make sense to the bar, pass muster with the
scholars, [but] if possible allay the suspicion of any [person] in the street who regards knowledge
of the law as no excuse for making it." Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm
of Reason, 7 Utah L. Rev. 157, 166 (1960).
32. Defending Justice Holmes against a professor's charge that one of his opinions was question-begging, Justice Frankfurter said that Holmes had tried to deal with the issues but discovered
after consulting with his fellow justices that "the boys wouldn't stand for" a good opinion. Shapiro,
100 Harv. L. Rev. at 742 (cited in note 23), quoting Harlan B. Phillips, ed., Felix Frankfurter
Reminisces 293-99 (Reynal, 1960).
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preme Court begins to explicitly enact the justices' policy views instead
of at least pretending to be interpreting the work of Congress.as There
is also deep concern with the dynamics of the nine-member Court who
must interact constantly as a group and have a strong interest in convincing each other that they are following the generally accepted job
description. And, of course, the intense public scrutiny of the Court's
work may well heighten a justice's concern about the way she is likely
to be treated in the annals of legal history. Not every judge strives to be
thought of in the way that so many think of William 0. Douglas.
The best rebuttal to Macey and Miller's point, however, is not any
hypothetical speculation about what they might do as judges in a case
like Weber. The best rebuttal is the Supreme Court's actual decision in
Weber. 4 If Macey and Miller are correct, then Justice Brennan should
have been expected to announce his decision upholding the plan by explaining exactly why, in his view, affirmative action is so useful a tool in
eradicating the effects of past societal discrimination. Surely there can
be no doubting the level of Justice Brennan's conviction that affirmative action is good social policy, a conviction that does not seem to be
overly affected by the kind of moral and intellectual uncertainty that
Macey and Miller describe. Furthermore, it is difficult to think of a
statute with which the judiciary has more expertise and familiarity than
Title VII.
The fact is, though, that Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
struggles mightily to find support for the decision in the legislative history of Title VII. He took pages to elaborate on his claim that "the
prohibition against racial discrimination in . . . Title VII must. . . be
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and
the historical context from which the Act arose." 5 And he went to great
lengths to support his contention that "[i]t plainly appears from the
House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not
intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as one method of solving this problem."3 6
The cloak of interpretive neutrality may have been quite transparent in Weber, as it often is. In the context of Weber, it seems widely
accepted that Title VII is quite susceptible to differing interpretations
and that Justice Brennan hardly succeeded in showing that the Court
had accurately discerned the intent of the Congress that enacted Title
33. See Walter Murphy, Elements of JudicialStrategy 31 (Chicago, 1964) (stating that even
a judge who has little respect for technical rules would find it prudent to assume such respect
before some of the popular, bureaucratic, or political checks were applied against his tribunal).
34. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id. at 203.
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VII. But the perceived need for both the majority and the dissent37 to
use this kind of interpretational rhetoric in Weber seems to run entirely
counter to the position advanced by Macey and Miller about judges'
eager desire to couch their decisions primarily on grounds of good public policy.
Notwithstanding all of the cases in which obviously ideologicallydriven judges defend their positions in terms of neutral canons, Macey
and Miller rail against the notion that canons often are used simply to
support a decision that was reached on a ground which the judge is
unwilling to publicly admit. Relying again on the Breininger case, they
argue that the Court's canon-based holding that the union had not violated Sections 101 and 609 of the LMRDA "can only be explained on
the basis of its lack of conviction about the nature and meaning of the
LMRDA." 's The purportedly canon-based decision could not, in their
view, have reflected a policy-based decision defended through the canons because such a decision would reflect hostility toward labor and
"Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion could hardly be
accused of that." 9
The initial problem with this analysis of the Breininger holding is
that this was a case of a union member suing his union. There is, therefore, no obvious "pro-labor" position. A ruling for Breininger (the union
member) would, necessarily, constitute a ruling against the union and
vice versa. Indeed, Justice Brennan's track record on cases filed by
union members against unions reflects a level of ambivalence that is
quite consistent with the split-the-baby approach that the Court
adopted in Breininger. °
More generally, even if Macey and Miller could prove that Brein37. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion comes a lot closer to the kind of
approach that Macey and Miller have described:
While I share some of the misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, ...
concerning the extent to which the legislative history of Title VII clearly supports the result the
Court reaches today, I believe that additional considerations, practical and equitable, only
partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the conclusion reached
by the Court today, and I therefore join its opinion as well as its judgment.
Id. at 209 (Blackmun concurring).
38. Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part III.D.3 (cited in note 1).
39. Id.
40. For a flavor of the tension that these cases create in the minds of traditional liberals, see
InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), in which the Court,
by a 5-4 vote, held that punitive damages may not be assessed against a union that breaches its
duty of fair representation by failing to pursue a grievance properly. In an opinion authored by
Justice Marshall and joined by Justice Brennan (both generally supporters of punitive damages)
the Court recognized the values served by punitive damages, but concluded that "offsetting these
potential benefits is the possibility that punitive awards could impair the financial stability of
unions and unsettle the careful balance of individual and collective interests which this Court has
previously articulated in the unfair representation area." Id. at 48.
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inger was an example of judges making their decisions, as opposed to
announcing their decisions, purely on the basis of canons, they still
would not have come close to proving their thesis that the factors that
prompt judges to rely on canons are lack of expertise, risk of error, and
relativity. It seems to me that a much more important factor is the
judge's tactfulness in picking her fights.
This tactfulness is critical because many of the same negative effects that confront a judge who explicitly announces her decision on
policy grounds also confront a judge who earns a reputation of consistently reaching decisions that comport with her policy views, even if she
always articulates the decision on neutral, interpretive grounds. One
way for a judge to avoid developing this reputation and to maintain a
high level of goodwill with her colleagues is for the judge to be willing
to sacrifice some cases by suspending policy preferences and reaching a
decision by following neutral canons to the extent they are dispositive.
If this is true, then the cases in which Macey/Miller-type judges are
willing to be guided by canons depends far more on how passionate the
judge feels about the issue involved; how passionate a colleague on the,
court may feel about it; and how interested the judge is in earning capital to be used in some future case in which the judge is especially interested. In sum, it depends on issues that we have no hope of articulating
clearly, much less identifying in operation.
If it is assumed that many judicial decisions invoking canons of
statutory interpretation are simply after-the-fact neutral justifications
for decisions reached on other grounds, then it is not difficult to answer
Macey and Miller's question as to why a judge might opt to employ a
canon as opposed to another interpretive tool (such as plain meaning or
legislative history) to justify a particular decision. One answer is that
the judge will use whatever tool sounds the most convincing in justifying the decision. 41 Another answer is that a judge's choice of whether to
address canons in the course of a decision is not always as wide open as
Macey and Miller have described it. In a very real sense judges take
cases as they find them. If a litigant has written a brief claiming that
she is entitled to relief primarily because of the clear applicability of
the ejusdem generis canon, ignoring that canon is not always an altogether acceptable option. Moreover, the costs of decisionmaking decrease considerably if the judge can incorporate the analysis provided in
the briefs, which means, of course, relying on the decisional grounds
41. Of course the judge might eschew reliance on a canon that is persuasive in a particular
case but which in most cases will lead to results that the judge would prefer to avoid. Demands of
consistency make it difficult for the judge to invoke a canon on Tuesday only to ignore its clear
application on Wednesday.
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that the parties have provided.4 2
III. CONCLUSION
Karl Llewellyn described the appellate court's "high task of so applying and so reshaping doctrine as to marry its duty to justice with its
duty to the rules of law as it has received them."4 In the case of statutory interpretation, the "duty to the rules of law" is generally recognized to carry with it the obligation for the judge to do her best to
interpret what Congress has said before she moves on to decide a case
explicitly on her own policy preferences. The canons are one of many
tools in this task. Whether or not a judge personally accepts this view of
her role, the dominant legal culture that restrains and evaluates judges
forces judges to adhere to it, at least in form. The interesting question
is, therefore, not why judges invoke canons to justify their decisions.
The question is why the legal culture continues to insist that they do.

42. This hypothesis could be tested by examining the briefs in cases where judges rely on
varying tools of statutory interpretation. I would expect that the incidence of judges following the
winning parties' choice of interpretive tool is at its greatest at the district court level where there is
much less time for the judges and their staffs to conduct independent research.
43. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition at 6 (cited in note 23).

